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Abstract—Policy design is an important part of software
development. As security breaches increase in variety, designing
a security policy that addresses all potential breaches becomes a
nontrivial task. A complete security policy would specify rules to
prevent breaches. Systematically determining which, if any, policy
clause has been violated by a reported breach is a means for
identifying gaps in a policy. Our research goal is to help analysts
measure the gaps between security policies and reported breaches
by developing a systematic process based on semantic reasoning.
We propose SEMAVER, a framework for determining coverage of
breaches by policies via comparison of individual policy clauses
and breach descriptions. We represent a security policy as a set of
norms. Norms (commitments, authorizations, and prohibitions)
describe expected behaviors of users, and formalize who is
accountable to whom and for what. A breach corresponds to
a norm violation. We develop a semantic similarity metric for
pairwise comparison between the norm that represents a policy
clause and the norm that has been violated by a reported breach.
We use the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) as a case study. Our investigation of a subset of
the breaches reported by the US Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) reveals the gaps between HIPAA and
reported breaches, leading to a coverage of 65%. Additionally,
our classification of the 1,577 HHS breaches shows that 44%
of the breaches are accidental misuses and 56% are malicious
misuses. We find that HIPAA’s gaps regarding accidental misuses
are significantly larger than its gaps regarding malicious misuses.
Index Terms—Security and privacy breaches, social norms,
breach ontology, semantic similarity
I. INTRODUCTION
A security policy describes the requirements, regulations,
and standards that an organization should meet to protect
its assets, and enables technical and social protocols to be
implemented accordingly. Designing a comprehensive policy
is the first step for implementing security controls, though not
a trivial task, especially for modern information systems where
users play an important role. As a result, policies are often
stated in an ambiguous manner [16], [27], and fail to address
specific breaches that happen in real life. A security breach
may be an accidental misuse or a malicious misuse. Malicious
misuses correspond to outsider attacks, whereas accidental
misuses correspond to insider attacks or human errors, some
of which are unavoidable given the needed functionality.
Gaps between (design time) security policies and (run time)
breaches are common in healthcare [20], [25]. Consider the
following breach and the corresponding US Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [8] clause:
Example 1. In 2010, a failure to erase data contained on
disposed photocopiers’ hard drives led to the disclosure of
patient records [9]. HIPAA clause 45 CFR 164.310–(d)(2)(i)
describes disposal of electronic records as follows: “Implement
policies and procedures to address the final disposition of
electronic protected health information, and/or the hardware
or electronic media on which it is stored.”
Identifying the commonalities and differences between pol-
icy clauses and breach descriptions is important for determin-
ing which, if any, policy clause has been violated by a reported
breach and identifying the gaps in between. In Example 1,
HIPAA states that electronic media on which patient records
are stored must be properly disposed of. According to the
breach, a specific incident occurred regarding photocopiers’
hard drives. A domain ontology captures relationships be-
tween such concepts, e.g., hard drives are electronic media.
Our research goal is to help analysts measure the gaps
between security policies and reported breaches by developing
a systematic process based on semantic reasoning.
Accordingly, we propose SEMAVER, a semantic reasoning
framework for measuring the gaps between a security policy
and reported breaches. We represent a security policy as
a set of norms. Norms (commitments, authorizations, and
prohibitions) describe the expectations of users from each
other regarding their social interactions, and formalize who
is accountable to whom and for what [13], [34]. For example,
healthcare employees are prohibited by their hospital from dis-
closing a patient’s medical condition. Norms may be violated
since the actions of users are unpredictable, e.g., an employee
shares a patient’s condition with a friend. A security breach
corresponds to a norm violation [15]. Therefore, we represent
a breach via a norm that has been violated in the breach.
We seek to address the following research questions:
RQ1: How can we formalize security policies and breaches
to bring out their mutual correspondence?
RQ2: What are the commonalities and differences between
concepts in security policies and breach descriptions?
RQ3: How do commonalities and differences between in-
dividual concepts correspond to gaps between security
policies and breaches?
RQ4: How prevalent are accidental misuses among reported
breaches, and do security policies account for them?
Current efforts on identifying potential breaches and elic-
iting security requirements propose visual representations to
assist in policy design [12], [17], [28], [36]. However, these
representations are either informal or not rich enough to per-
form semantic reasoning. A normative representation enables
us to build a correspondence between policies and breaches
(RQ1). We develop a healthcare breach ontology using breach
descriptions reported by the US Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) [9]. We propose a semantic similarity
metric to understand how various breach concepts relate to
each other (RQ2). We extend the similarity metric for pairwise
comparison between a norm that represents a policy clause
and a norm that represents a breach. We further extend norm
similarity as a general metric (policy coverage) to measure
the gaps between a security policy and breaches (RQ3). We
provide a classification of breaches to differentiate between
accidental and malicious misuses (RQ4).
Our contributions include (i) a formal representation of
security policies and breaches via norms; (ii) a semantic
similarity metric for the pairwise comparison of norms; (iii) a
policy coverage metric to measure the gaps between a policy
and breaches; and (iv) a classification of breach types.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
reviews the technical background for our framework. Sec-
tion III describes the elements of the SEMAVER framework.
Section IV presents a HIPAA case study. Section V describes
the limitations of our framework. Section VI reviews the
relevant literature. Section VII presents future directions.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
We now review the necessary background for SEMAVER.
A. Norms
Definition 1 describes a norm as a directed relation between
two parties [34]. We consider three types of norms: commit-
ments, authorizations, and prohibitions.
Definition 1. A norm is a tuple 〈n, SBJ, OBJ, ant, con〉, where
n, its type, is one of {c, a, p}; SBJ is its subject; OBJ is its
object; ant is its antecedent; and con is its consequent. Here,
SBJ and OBJ are roles adopted by people or organizations;
ant and con are propositional conditions. We write a norm as
n(SBJ, OBJ, ant, con).
A norm is detached when its antecedent holds, meaning that
the norm is active. Violation conditions differ according to the
type of norm, as we describe next.
A commitment means that its subject is committed to its
object to bringing about the consequent if the antecedent
holds. For example, healthcare workers are committed to
their hospital to properly disposing of patients’ electronic
health records (EHRs) from any media that is obsolete. The
healthcare worker is accountable for improper disposal of
EHRs. If a patient’s protected health information (PHI) is
improperly disposed of, the commitment is violated.
An authorization means that its subject is authorized by its
object to bring about the consequent if the antecedent holds.
For example, physicians are authorized by their hospital to
access all patients’ EHRs when there is an emergency. The
hospital is accountable for not allowing physicians to do so.
If a physician tries to access a patient’s EHR in an emergency,
but is denied access, the authorization is violated.
A prohibition means that its subject is prohibited by its
object from bringing about the consequent if the antecedent
holds. For example, physicians are prohibited by their hospital
from sharing patients’ PHI with outsiders. A physician is
accountable for disclosure of a patient’s PHI. If a patient’s
PHI is disclosed to outsiders, the prohibition is violated.
B. Ontologies
An ontology is a conceptualization of a particular domain
[6]. By having a formal ontology, one can specify domain con-
cepts and relations among them to perform semantic reasoning.
Ontology concepts are tied together via relations. Two domain-
independent relations are important. The is-a relation denotes
that a concept is a type of another concept, e.g., an Accidental
Misuse is a Breach. Certain properties of a concept can be
described via the has-a relation, e.g., an Accidental Misuse
has an Actor. Here, we can specify the property hasActor for
the concept Accidental Misuse. The range of the property is
another concept User, and its arity is 1..N as an accidental
misuse may involve one or more actors. Additional relations
can be added to the ontology to make a domain representation
richer. Once a domain is represented as an ontology, one can
perform semantic reasoning on it using inference rules. A
sample rule is that a physician needs a valid license to operate
upon patients. Now, the type of license (which may also be
given as a taxonomy in the ontology) may depend upon the
type of operation.
From a security and privacy perspective, the nature of
information content can be represented in an ontology. For
example, if a hospital prohibits its employees from disclos-
ing patients’ PHI, then given an ontology for healthcare
information, semantic reasoning can discover that a patient’s
laboratory results are part of the patient’s PHI and should not
be disclosed, whereas the state the patient resides in is not
part of the patient’s PHI and disclosing it would not violate
the prohibition.
Ontologies for security and privacy are emerging. Souag et
al. [36] propose a security ontology to anticipate cybersecurity
attacks during early requirements elicitation stage. They gather
related knowledge from security standards and analyze other
(incomplete) security ontologies to develop their ontology.
We share the motivation that a formal ontology would help
security analysts design security policies with wider coverage
of concepts. We adopt some of Souag et al.’s concepts,
including organizations (sociotechnical systems with people
and software) and methods of attack. Moreover, we take
a more practical approach and focus on reported security
breaches. Our ontology can be used to understand the common
properties of breaches as well as to compute how well they
are covered by security policies.
Slavin et al. [35] propose a privacy-policy-phrase ontology
to detect misalignments between privacy policies and API
methods of Android applications. They aim to understand
which applications that have access to sensitive information
violate the stated privacy policies. Slavin et al.’s approach
provides a mapping between the API methods and policy
terminology, and detects whether there is no violation, a
potential weak violation, or a potential strong violation. Their
ontology is limited to a taxonomy. Apart from the fact that
their domain and ours are different, our ontology is enriched
with properties that enable us to perform semantic reasoning.
C. Semantic Similarity
A formal ontology enables semantic reasoning over con-
cepts and relationships, especially to determine how various
breach concepts relate to each other. We extend this reasoning
to provide a formal comparison of norms, which is used to
measure how much a security policy differs from breaches.
Resnik [29] proposes a measure to compute similarity of
concepts given in a taxonomy with is-a relations. A common
way to compute similarity is to calculate the distance between
concepts, with the shorter path indicating a higher similarity
between them. However, links in a taxonomy (is-a relations)
do not always represent uniform distances. Resnik proposes
an alternative way to compute similarity based on information
content. Empirical evaluation shows that Resnik’s measure is
the closest to human judgment among other taxonomy based
distance metrics such as node distance and edge counting
[32]. Lin [21] builds upon Resnik’s information theoretic
metric to compare concepts in a taxonomy by identifying the
commonalities as well as the differences between the concepts.
We go beyond similarity in a taxonomy, and use properties of
concepts to provide a richer similarity metric.
Rodrı´guez et al. [31] propose a method to compute similar-
ity of concepts contained in different ontologies. Their method
systematically detects similar concepts across ontologies via
a matching process based on specifications such as synonym
sets and semantic neighborhoods. We currently have a single
breach ontology developed based on the knowledge gathered
from HHS incidents. Finding similarity between random words
such as triangle and breach [21], [29], or identifying syn-
onyms [18], [24] are out of our scope. However, it would
be interesting to extend our ontology with knowledge from
other domains, and compare various breach concepts using
the proposed methods.
III. SEMAVER FRAMEWORK
This section describes our development of SEMAVER: (i)
a breach ontology based on reported breach incidents, (ii) a
formal representation of policies and breaches via norms, (iii)
semantic similarity relations for ontology concepts as well as
norms, and (iv) a methodology for measuring how much a
security policy differs from associated breaches (coverage).
Throughout this section, we use examples from the healthcare
domain to explain elements of SEMAVER.
A. Ontology Development
Figure 1 shows how a breach ontology can be constructed
using both generic and domain-dependent concepts. Under the
general concept Breach, we have its subclasses described via
is-a relations, e.g., Unintentional disclosure is a Breach. The
action Share PHI with family, while performed intentionally by
the physician, does not involve any malicious intent of disclos-
ing patient’s data. Note that some concepts (e.g., Accidental
Misuse) are omitted for brevity. A detailed description of our
healthcare breach ontology is presented in Section IV-B (see
also Figure 4). Having such a hierarchy of breach concepts in
an ontology is helpful for developing semantic similarity based
on the distance between concepts. However, taxonomic dis-
tance itself is not a sufficient measure to determine similarity:
pairs of concepts that have the same taxonomic distance from
each other may have different conceptual similarity. Therefore,
we describe properties of concepts with has-a relations, e.g.,
Malware has actor Adversary. Note that an ontology concept
can have multiple properties: the figure shows only one
property for brevity. Moreover, properties can be related to
each other via is-a relations (see Figure 2 for an ontology of


















Phishing Share PHIwith outsider
hasActor:
Employee
Fig. 1. Breach concepts. Lines represent subclass (is-a) relations among
concepts. Arrows represent properties of concepts (has-a relations).
B. Representing Policies and Breaches
A norm supports accountability between its subject and ob-
ject, thus provide a natural means of formalizing policy clauses
that capture security and privacy requirements. Examples 2
and 3 describe two clauses of HIPAA together with the norms
that formalize them.
Example 2. HIPAA clause 45 CFR 164.510 describes disclo-
sure conditions of patients’ PHI as follows:
“The covered entity may orally inform the individual of and
obtain the individual’s oral agreement or objection to a use
or disclosure permitted by this section.”
This clause is represented with the following
prohibition: p(PHYSICIAN, COVERED ENTITY, ¬consent,
share PHI family). That is, a physician working in the
covered entity (e.g., a healthcare provider organization) is
prohibited from sharing a patient’s PHI with the patient’s
family unless a consent is obtained from the patient. Note
that the ¬ symbol denotes negation.
Moreover, subclause 45 CFR 164.510–(b) Permitted uses
and disclosures of the above clause states the following:
“The requirements to obtain a patient’s agreement to speak
with family members or friends involved in the patients care
can be waived during national disasters.”
This subclause can be represented with the following autho-
rization: a(PHYSICIAN, COVERED ENTITY, national disaster,
share PHI family). That is, a physician is authorized to share
a patient’s PHI with the patient’s family in a national disaster.
Example 3. Consider HIPAA clause 45 CFR 164.310–
(d)(2)(i) from Example 1, which we represent as the following
commitment: c(HEALTHCARE WORKER, COVERED ENTITY,
media disposal, erase media). That is, healthcare workers
are committed to a covered entity for proper destruction of
patients’ EHRs that are stored on electronic media.
The above examples demonstrate how we can specify norms
to formalize individual clauses of a security policy. Defini-
tion 2 describes a security policy as a set of norms, where
each norm corresponds to a clause of the policy.
Definition 2. A security policy S is a set of norms, S = {n1,
. . . , nk}.
Next, we formalize breaches. Definition 3 describes a breach
as a norm violation.
Definition 3. A breach bi is a violation of a norm ni, i.e., bi
= violated(ni).
Let us see example breaches summarized from the HHS de-
scriptions [9], and corresponding norm violations. Example 4
revisits Example 1 regarding improper disposal of EHRs.
Example 4. Consider the breach in Example 1, where
a healthcare worker did not erase the photocopiers’
hard drives. That breach is a violation of the com-
mitment c(HEALTHCARE WORKER, COVERED ENTITY, me-
dia disposal, erase media), because the commitment is de-
tached when the photocopier (a certain type of media) is
disposed of, but the subject of the commitment failed to bring
about the consequent.
Example 5 describes an incident regarding the use of
personal devices for work purposes.
Example 5. Consider the following breach reported by HHS
regarding Iowa Department of Human Services:
“Employees of the covered entity used personal email
accounts, personal online storage accounts and personal
electronic devices for work purposes. From February 5,
2010 to January 17, 2014, the protected health information
(PHI) of 2,042 individuals was transferred outside of the
covered entity’s secure network in this manner.”
This breach is a violation of the prohibition
p(HEALTHCARE WORKER, COVERED ENTITY, true,
use personal device), because healthcare workers are
prohibited from using personal devices for work at all times
(the prohibition is detached since the antecedent is true).
C. Similarity Metric
We develop a similarity metric to compare ontology con-
cepts and norms. Our similarity metric adopts ideas from the
literature on ontologies [29], [32], [33], [39], and extends it
for pairwise comparison of norms. Moreover, our similarity
metric uses the specified properties of concepts as well as the
relations among properties to enable a deeper understanding
of similarity.
Equation 1 describes the distance between two ontology
concepts c1 and c2 via edge count(c1, c2), which is the
number of edges connecting concepts c1 and c2.
∆c1,c2 = edge count(c1, c2) (1)
Assumption 1. There are no multiple inheritance relations in
the healthcare breach ontology.
Assumption 2. Subclass (is-a) relationships in the healthcare
breach ontology are of equal importance.
Equation 1 computes distance for tree-like taxonomies,
and does not work when multiple inheritance is allowed
(Assumption 1). Edges have uniform weights (Assumption 2).
Therefore, we count each edge as one.
Equation 2 describes our similarity metric between two
ontology concepts c1 and c2 (simc1,c2 ). We denote taxonomy-
based distance between concepts c1 and c2 via ∆c1,c2 , and











The maximum possible similarity value, of one, is only
achieved when two concepts are identical. Let us revisit
Example 1. HIPAA states that electronic media on which
patient records are stored must be properly disposed of.
According to the breach, a specific incident occurred regarding
photocopiers’ hard drives. HIPAA states the parent concept
(electronic media), which provides maximum coverage for
photocopiers.
Equation 3 describes property similarity between concepts
c1 and c2 based on the set of common properties (P) of c1











































Equation 3 resembles Lin’s [21] commonality measure in
the sense that we explore the common properties of concepts to
determine their similarity. Lin’s commonality and differences
measures rely on information content derived from instances
of concepts (e.g., a probability distribution). We look at the
similarity between generic concepts such as Breach and Ad-
versary. Deriving such a probability distribution from breach
descriptions is left for future work.
Assumption 3. min sim = 0.001.
When two concepts have no common properties, we assign
a minimum value (min sim) to the similarity between them
according to Assumption 3. Note that min sim can be defined
based on the size of the ontology. For example, for an ontology
containing 100 to 1,000 concepts, min sim = 10−3 = 0.001.
Let us revisit the ontology of Figure 1 and see examples
of how taxonomy-based distance and property similarity are
calculated.
Example 6. Consider concepts Share PHI with family and
Share PHI with colleague. These concepts have the same
parent. Thus, simShare PHI with family,Share PHI with colleague = 0.33 ×
sim
prop
Share PHI with family,Share PHI with colleague.
Example 7. Consider concepts Share PHI with fam-
ily and Share PHI with outsider. These concepts are
not as similar as the concepts in Example 6, be-
cause there are three concepts in between the two con-
cepts. Thus, simShare PHI with family,Share PHI with outsider = 0.2 ×
sim
prop
Share PHI with family,Share PHI with outsider.
Taxonomy distance gives a good estimate of how similar the
concepts are (Examples 6 and 7). However, taxonomy distance
alone is not always adequate for determining similarity when
several concepts have the same distance from each other.
Example 8 calculates property similarity using the ontology
of healthcare users shown in Figure 2.
Example 8. The distance between concepts Share PHI
with family and Share PHI with outsider and the distance
between concepts Share PHI with family and Malware are
the same. However, Share PHI with outsider and Malware are
not necessarily similar concepts. Therefore, we need to take
into account the properties of those concepts to determine
similarity. Let us assume that the only common property
of the concepts Share PHI with family, Share PHI with
outsider, and Malware is hasActor. According to Equation 3,
similarity between the actors Physician (for Share PHI with
family) and Employee (for Share PHI with outsider) is 0.5.
Thus, simShare PHI with family,Share PHI with outsider = 0.2 × 0.5 = 0.1.
Likewise, similarity between the actors Physician (for Share
PHI with family) and Adversary (for Malware) is 0.25. Thus,
simShare PHI with family,Malware = 0.1 × 0.25 = 0.025.
We build upon Equation 2 to compare norms based on their
individual elements. Note that the subject and object of a norm
correspond to concepts given in Figure 2, and the antecedent
and consequent correspond to concepts given in Figure 1.
Definition 4 describes norm similarity.
Definition 4. The similarity between norms n1(SBJ1, OBJ1,
ant1, con1) and n2(SBJ2, OBJ2, ant2, con2) is the average sim-
ilarity of its elements: simn1,n2 = (simSBJ1,SBJ2 + simOBJ1,OBJ2 +
simant1,ant2 + simcon1,con2 ) / 4.
Assumption 4. simφ,true = min sim.
Note that the antecedent of a norm can be true. According
to Assumption 4, we assign the minimum similarity value to
any predicate that is compared with true. Example 9 shows an
example of norm similarity.
Example 9. Consider norms p1(PHYSICIAN,
HOSPITAL, ¬emergency, share PHI family) and
p2(HEALTHCARE WORKER, COVERED ENTITY, true,
share PHI outsider). Similarity between subjects is












Fig. 3. SEMAVER methodology for determining policy coverage.
between objects is simHOSPITAL,COVERED ENTITY = 0.5. Similarity
between antecedents is sim¬emergency,true = 0.001. Similarity
between consequents is simshare PHI family,share PHI outsider =
0.2× 0.5 = 0.1. Thus, simp1,p2 = 0.19.
Norms of different types are not similar. According to
Assumption 5, we assign the minimum similarity value to
comparisons between different norm types.
Assumption 5. simc,a = simc,p = sima,p = min sim.
Now, we are ready to describe our policy coverage metric
based on norm similarity. First, we present a list of reasoning
postulates that transform norms with conjunctive and disjunc-
tive propositions to norms with only atomic propositions.
Postulate 1. A norm whose antecedent is a disjunction of
two propositions can be represented via two norms whose
antecedents are the individual propositions: n(SBJ, OBJ, ant1
∨ ant2, con) if and only if n(SBJ, OBJ, ant1, con) and n(SBJ,
OBJ, ant2, con).
Postulate 2. A commitment whose consequent is a conjunction
of two propositions can be represented via two commitments
whose consequents are are the individual propositions: c(SBJ,
OBJ, ant, con1 ∧ con2) if and only if c(SBJ, OBJ, ant, con1)
and c(SBJ, OBJ, ant, con2).
Postulate 3. An authorization whose consequent is a disjunc-
tion of two propositions can be represented via two autho-
rizations whose consequents are the individual propositions:
a(SBJ, OBJ, ant, con1 ∨ con2) if and only if a(SBJ, OBJ, ant,
con1) and a(SBJ, OBJ, ant, con2).
Postulate 4. A prohibition whose consequent is a disjunction
of two propositions can be represented via two prohibitions
whose consequents are the individual propositions: p(SBJ,
OBJ, ant, con1 ∨ con2) if and only if p(SBJ, OBJ, ant, con1)
and p(SBJ, OBJ, ant, con2).
Definition 5 describes how norm n1 covers norm n2 so that
n2 can be replaced by n1. Simply put, n1 covers n2 if n1 is
satisfied whenever n2 is satisfied [13]. Note that the ⊢ symbol
represents logical consequence.
Definition 5. Commitment c(SBJ, OBJ, ant1, con1) covers
commitment c(SBJ, OBJ, ant2, con2) if and only if ant2 ⊢ ant1
and con1 ⊢ con2. Authorization a(SBJ, OBJ, ant1, con1) covers
authorization a(SBJ, OBJ, ant2, con2) if and only if ant1 ⊢ ant2
and con1 ⊢ con2. Prohibition p(SBJ, OBJ, ant1, con1) covers
prohibition p(SBJ, OBJ, ant2, con2) if and only if ant2 ⊢ ant1
and con2 ⊢ con1.
Note that the subjects and objects must be identical for a
norm to cover another norm. However, we can use the covers
relation in combination with our similarity metric for the
subjects and objects to determine to what extent a norm covers
another norm. That is, if norm n1 covers n2, then the similarity
between their antecedents and consequents is one, which
constitutes half of norm similarity according to Definition 4.
The remaining half is determined by the similarity between
their subjects and objects. Equation 4 describes how similarity




= 0.5 + (simSBJ1,SBJ2 + simOBJ1,OBJ2)/2 (4)
Equation 5 builds upon the above development to describe
policy coverage that is an average of the similarity values
between the norms representing each breach and the corre-
sponding policy clause. B represents the set of all breaches,













Figure 3 summarizes our methodology for measuring how
well a security policy covers reported breaches. Steps 1 and 3
presuppose familiarity with conceptual modeling based on
norms. For Steps 1 to 3, we can employ multiple modelers
who work independently. Step 4 is needed only when two or
more modelers are employed. Let us review each step:
1) Represent breach: Specify the relevant norms for each
breach.
2) Identify policy clause: For each breach in Step 1, identify
a clause of the policy that is the most relevant to the
scenario described in the breach. Note that there might
be cases where the incident describes a general privacy
breach, and it might not be clear which HIPAA policy
clause is violated.
3) Represent policy clause: Specify the norms for the iden-
tified policy clauses in Step 2. Note that one would
normally decide whether an incident is a breach by first
representing the policy [15]. Here, a breach is an estab-
lished fact: thus, our reasoning begins by investigating
the breaches. Working backwards from breaches saves
significant effort by investigating only relevant policy
clauses.
4) Resolve disagreements: Discuss and resolve any disagree-
ments for Steps 1–3. For any unresolved disagreement,
employ a more experienced modeler to specify the norms
after reviewing the disagreement.
5) Calculate policy coverage: Feed the norms that represent
breaches and relevant policy clauses together with the
coverage metric (Equation 5) into the semantic reasoner.
The output (policy coverage) shows how much the policy
differs from reported breaches.
IV. CASE STUDY: HHS SECURITY AND PRIVACY
BREACHES
We now evaluate the SEMAVER framework on the HIPAA
policy using the HHS breach reports.1 We are mainly inter-
ested in HIPAA security and privacy clauses that are relevant
to the breaches reported by HHS.
A. HHS Breach Report
We investigate 1,577 security and privacy incidents reported
in an HHS breach report [9]. HHS provides a classification of
the breaches contained in the dataset as shown in Table I. Out
of the 1,577 breaches, 219 incidents are unclassified. Of these,
40 incidents are marked as other, 5 incidents are marked as




Hacking 191 Incidents where an adversary exploits a soft-
ware vulnerability to access patients’ EHRs
Theft 642 Incidents where an employee (insider) ac-
cesses patients’ EHRs and discloses their
PHI to outsiders
Loss 129 Incidents where electronic media that con-
tain patients’ PHI are lost from the posses-
sion of an employee
Unauthorized
access/disclosure 338 Incidents where a patients’ EHR is disclosed
due to unauthorized access
Improper
disposal
58 Incidents where a healthcare worker fails to
properly dispose of patients’ EHRs, leaving
their PHI exposed
Unclassified 219 Not classified by HHS
B. Healthcare Breach Ontology
Figure 4 shows a screenshot of our breach ontology from
the Prote´ge´ ontology development tool. In addition to the
concepts described in Figures 1 and 2, the complete ontology
contains a total of 104 concepts as well as some instances of
concepts gathered from the HHS incidents. For example, Iowa
Department of Human Services is an instance of the ontology
concept Covered entity (see Example 5).
1Case study materials can be found in https://research.csc.ncsu.edu/mas/
code/security/semaver/.
The complete ontology describes additional concepts and
properties such as the scale of an organization and type
of attack. Correlation among these concepts would help us
understand whether attackers are targeting large organizations
where the potential damage (e.g., the number of affected
people) is large, but the chances of a successful attack may
be low. We can also calculate the frequency of such attacks.
Further investigation in this area is left for future work.
Our breach ontology contains an ontology of norms, which
is connected to the rest of the ontology through the elements
of a norm. For example, the subject and object of a norm are
users from Figure 2, and the antecedent and consequent of a
norm include propositions described in Figure 1.
C. Application of SEMAVER
Now, we describe how we apply the SEMAVER methodology
(Section III-D) for the HIPAA policy and associated HHS
breaches. We randomly selected a subset of the breaches
from the HHS dataset which represent unique cases. Note that
most of the incidents describe similar breach scenarios and
thus correspond to the same HIPAA clauses. Two researchers
(undergraduate students) independently specified the norms. In
a previous study [13], we have shown that users can specify
norms for requirements with minimal training.
Examples 10 and 11 demonstrate sample breaches and the
application of the SEMAVER methodology on them.
Example 10. In 2014, a contractor of a covered entity,
who is also the husband of an employee of the covered
entity, accessed patient records without proper authorization
and disclosed their PHI. The associated HIPAA clause 45 CFR
164.308–(b)(2) states the following regarding business asso-
ciates: “A business associate may permit a business associate
that is a subcontractor to create, receive, maintain, or transmit
electronic protected health information on its behalf only if
the business associate obtains satisfactory assurances.”
The researchers individually specified the following norm
for the breach in Example 10: p1(CONTRACTOR, COV-
ERED ENTITY, ¬consent, access EHR). The researchers
agreed on the following norm regarding the HIPAA
clause: p2(CONTRACTOR, COVERED ENTITY, ¬consent, ac-
cess EHR ∨ disclose PHI). According to Definition 5, p2
covers p1. Moreover, the subjects and objects of the norms
are identical. Thus, simp2,p1 = 1.
Example 11. In 2015, an employee of a covered entity
emailed a questionnaire to patients without using blind carbon
copy (bcc) to hide patient names. The most relevant HIPAA
clause 45 CFR 164.502–(a)(1) states the following regarding
the disclosure of PHI: “A covered entity is permitted to
disclose protected health information to the individual.”
The researchers individually specified the
following norms for the breach in Example 11:
c1(HEALTHCARE WORKER, HOSPITAL, email, bcc)
and c2(EMPLOYEE, COVERED ENTITY, email patients,
bcc). After discussion, c1 and c2 are resolved into the
Fig. 4. Healthcare breach ontology in Prote´ge´. The top left pane shows the class hierarchy, and the top right pane depicts the class hierarchy as a diagram.
In addition to the class hierarchy, concepts can be connected to each other via properties. The bottom left pane shows object properties, and the bottom right
pane shows the domain and range of an object property.
following: c3(HEALTHCARE WORKER, COVERED ENTITY,
email patients, bcc patients). The researchers agreed
on the following norm regarding the HIPAA clause:
a1(HEALTHCARE WORKER, COVERED ENTITY,
request individual, disclose PHI individual). According
to Assumption 5, sima1,c3 = 0.001.
D. Results
We now present our findings based on the 1,577 breaches re-
ported in the HHS dataset. We randomly selected 40 breaches
representative of the number of occurrences in the HHS
classification (Table I): seven hacking incidents, 15 theft in-
cidents, five loss incidents, 10 unauthorized access/disclosure
incidents, and three improper disposal incidents.
RQ1 and RQ2: We investigate how policy clauses differ
from breaches with respect to individual elements of a norm.
Figure 5 shows that the similarity between the actors (subjec-
t/object of a norm) stated in policies and breaches is higher
than the assets (antecedent and consequent of a norm). The
similarity of individual norm elements enables us to identify
where commonalities and differences reside between policy
clauses and breach descriptions. Norm similarity (Definition 4)
can be refined according to these findings (e.g., consequent
may be given a higher weight since it has the lowest similarity
value) to provide a more realistic measure of coverage.
RQ3: Using policy coverage (Equation 5), we measure the
gaps between HIPAA and HHS breaches. Based on the 40
incidents, we find that HIPAA has a general coverage of 65%.
Moreover, the fact that consequent similarity is the lowest
(Figure 5) implies that there are gaps in HIPAA policy for
stating what needs to be done or avoided to prevent breaches.
RQ4: We extend the classification provided by HHS for
the 1,577 breaches. We differentiate between two types of
breaches: accidental misuses (due to interactions of health-
care workers) and malicious misuses (outsider attacks). We
confirm via the descriptions of the breaches that the categories
hacking and theft contain malicious misuse incidents, and loss,
unauthorized access/disclosure, and improper disposal contain
accidental misuse incidents. For the remaining unclassified
incidents (other, unknown, and unmarked), we have provided
a classification based on the given descriptions. Out of the
40 incidents in the other category, one is malicious misuse,
10 are accidental misuses, and 29 have no description. Out
of the five incidents in the unknown category, two are ac-
cidental misuses and three have no description. Out of the
174 unmarked incidents, 27 are malicious misuses, 132 are
accidental misuses, and 15 have no description. Excluding
incidents without descriptions, we obtain a total of 1,530
classified breaches, of which 669 are accidental and 861 are
malicious misuses. That is, 44% of the incidents are caused
by accidental misuses, which indicates that regulating the
social interactions of users is as important as developing a

















Fig. 5. Similarity for individual norm elements.
secure software infrastructure to prevent security breaches.
Moreover, we compute coverage for each breach category to
understand which parts of HIPAA contain more gaps and need
revision. Figure 6 shows that HIPAA provides better coverage
for malicious misuses than accidental misuses (except for
the improper disposal category which constitutes the smallest
portion of the breaches). This result reinforces the fact that
designing policies to address all potential accidental misuses
is a nontrivial task as users become central to information
systems. Recent cybersecurity reports [4] and surveys [10]
corroborate our findings that healthcare security and privacy
policies need continual revision, especially due to emerging
threats regarding accidental misuses.
Our coverage metric further breaks down the 65% coverage
result, and uncovers practically valuable information: which
elements of a policy clause (Figure 5) and which policy
categories (Figure 6) need more attention. Although increased
coverage does not necessarily imply superior breach preven-
tion policies with increased coverage of breaches is crucial for
implementing improved security. Semantic reasoning can help
fill the gaps between policies and breaches. For example, if a
policy clause states protection of one asset, and a reported
breach indicates another asset, it would be reasonable to
consider all similar assets in between those two assets.
V. LIMITATIONS AND THREATS TO VALIDITY
We identify the following limitations and threats to valid-
ity for SEMAVER. First, modeling of security policies and
breaches is subjective and inherently error prone. Although we
minimize subjectivity and potential errors by independently
specifying norms with multiple researchers and resolving
disagreements, we cannot completely eliminate subjectivity in
specifying the norms.
Second, we cannot assess the completeness of the breaches
reported in the HHS dataset. Although we classified all inci-
dents into specific breach categories and identified that some
breaches are more common than others and most scenarios
overlap with each other, we cannot construct a theoretical
proof towards completeness that will guarantee no other breach
category will emerge. However, our investigation provides
a thorough study of the reported healthcare breaches and
proposes a realistic measure of policy coverage.























Fig. 6. Policy clause coverage by breach category.
Third, the coverage of breach concepts by our ontology
is based only on the incidents from the healthcare domain.
While relying upon HHS breaches is fine for measuring the
coverage of the HIPAA policy, not including breaches from
other domains poses a threat to the validity of our framework
for computing similarity in those domains. We will investigate
other domains and extend our ontology to mitigate this threat.
VI. RELATED WORK
Brost and Hoffmann [2] discuss security and privacy re-
lated misuses in eHealth systems and their connection with
the STRIDE threat model [11]. They consider misuse case
diagrams [17] in identifying and mitigating threats, and ex-
periment on a platform that brings together physicians, nurses,
and patients to study cases where patient data can be disclosed
from smartphones via malicious applications. Matulevic˘ius et
al. [23] investigate misuse cases for security modeling using
the Information System Risk Management (ISSRM) model.
Misuse case diagrams are helpful in visually representing
the vulnerabilities of a software system. However, they are
often given in general terms, and can cause misinterpretation.
Therefore, Matulevic˘ius et al. take into account risk-related
concepts, i.e., the likelihood of a threat occurring. Ko¨kciyan
and Yolum [19] investigate and categorize privacy breaches
in online social networks via a semantic understanding of the
events that lead to the breaches. Such breaches mostly corre-
spond to accidental misuses where the users’ commitments are
violated. We investigate cases where the interactions among
healthcare users lead to misuses. In SEMAVER, we represent
misuse cases (breaches) as norm violations, which enables us
to formally reason about them.
Hao et al. [7] propose a method for designing minimal
effective normative models to coordinate agents in an open
system. It would be interesting to apply their method to
security policy design, and come up with a minimal policy
that fills the gaps regarding associated breaches.
Elahi et al. [5] propose an ontology for analyzing attacks
and vulnerabilities regarding security requirements. They pro-
vide a catalog for vulnerabilities based on knowledge gathered
from portals such as the National Vulnerability Database
or Common Weakness Enumeration. Their ontology includes
formal definitions of concepts such as attack, risk, and counter-
measure, and is integrated into misuse case diagrams and other
conceptual modeling frameworks. In contrast, we develop a
richer sociotechnical model of policies and breaches that is
centered on norms. Such a formal representation can enable
further kinds of reasoning. Moreover, we introduce concepts
regarding accidental misuse.
Yskout et al. [41] show that although teams tasked with
implementing the security requirements of a banking system
prefer security patterns although they do not perform con-
clusively better than teams with no pattern aid. We posit
that patterns can be helpful for security design, provided
these patterns are expressed in high-level terms closer to
stakeholder requirements than to technical specifications. Our
representation centered on norms can potentially provide a
basis for the appropriate patterns and tools.
We have proposed design patterns for the revision of (social)
system specifications with respect to changing requirements
[13]. It would be interesting to drive how the patterns apply
from observed breaches placed in a breach ontology. We have
also developed a way to compare sociotechnical specifications
in terms of their liveness and safety [14]. It would be interest-
ing to identify the underlying requirements that lead users to
accidentally or knowingly cause security breaches, as a way of
specifying policies that accommodate user needs and reduce
the temptation for workarounds.
Alrajeh et al. [1] propose requirements revision in the case
of risks that hinder expected behavior of software. They pro-
pose a goal-driven risk analysis method via obstacle analysis.
Rashid et al. [28] perform multi incident analysis to discover
unknown known security requirements, which represent emer-
gent requirements that implicitly appear in security incidents
(known), but are not familiar to requirements engineers (un-
known). Our investigation of HHS breaches reveals important
risks in the healthcare domain that need to be addressed,
especially regarding interactions among healthcare employees.
Natural language requirements documents are helpful in
providing a high level understanding of stakeholder require-
ments. However, they create ambiguity for requirements engi-
neering [16], where a requirement is interpreted differently by
individual stakeholders. Detecting and resolving such ambi-
guities in earlier stages of software development is crucial as
ambiguities may lead to greater problems in later stages. Our
work aims at identifying gaps between policies and breaches,
which would enable analysts to resolve ambiguities in specific
policy clauses. Popescu et al. [27] propose a semiautomated
process and a tool, Dowser, for identifying ambiguities in
natural language software requirements specifications. Dowser
relies on a semantic model and a formal grammar, and aims
at overcoming the difficulties humans have when identifying
ambiguities. Human judgment is still needed to determine
whether a produced model represents a good set of require-
ments. Yang et al. [40] propose a machine learning method
for detecting whether an ambiguity is nocuous (potentially
harmful) or not. Riaz et al. [30] propose a framework to infer
implied security requirements from functional requirements
written in natural language via security goal patterns. They
evaluate the usability and efficiency of their patterns via a
user study on various security scenarios. We do not classify
ambiguities in policy clauses based on their harmfulness.
However, our approach helps understand which policy clauses
need revision with respect to the severity of the associated
breaches. Our foundation in norms can help reason about
security requirements from a higher-level perspective that is
closer to stakeholders’ understanding.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed SEMAVER, a semantic reasoning framework
for identifying gaps between security policies and breaches.
We investigated breaches reported by HHS, and found that ac-
cidental misuses are almost as prevalent as malicious misuses,
which indicates that human factors are as important as fixing
vulnerabilities for preventing breaches. To our best knowledge,
SEMAVER is the first attempt to investigate real breaches for
evaluating policies. A natural next step is to perform formal
revision of policies based the identified gaps.
We found that HIPAA has better coverage for malicious mis-
uses than accidental misuses. HIPAA is a dominant healthcare
standard, and our findings would illustrate similar concerns
in other domains. In essence, our coverage metric measures
whether the incident described by a breach description has
been considered by policy designers. Validation of the cover-
age metric is left for future work, which would involve addi-
tional breach incidents from other domains [22]. In particular,
we plan to investigate the Verizon Data Breach Investigations
Reports [38], the DataLoss Database [3], and the Principedia
privacy incidents database [37].
Most parts of SEMAVER can be automated. First, norm
similarity can be used to identify the most relevant policy
clause to a given breach, which would reduce the manual
effort and prevent potential human errors. Second, natural
language processing can be adopted to automatically extract
norms from policies and breaches. Third, we can develop
heuristic guidelines for the development of the breach ontol-
ogy, where concepts and properties are automatically extracted
from breach descriptions.
Threat models, such as misuse case diagrams or attack/de-
fense (A/D) trees, describe potential ways a software system
can be attacked and how those attacks can be mitigated [12],
[26]. While threat models identify potential breaches, they
do not directly translate to policy designs. It would be an
important contribution to investigate how SEMAVER can help
bridge this gap, in particular via norm-based patterns [13].
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